Posolsvetla

If you mean customized messages, than no, it's not possible to setup multiple, each one for different scenario.

In most cases only domain is sent, but the whole URL can be sent as well. The URL part after ? or # is not sent. Currently the URL can be quite easily read from the request, however these days we are in the process of releasing a new functionality for the encryption of these requests. The process should be finished in November if no blocking issues emerge. The URLs are not kept at our servers at all.

We are already investigating an issue with the same symptoms, so it might be the same issue in fact. Does the certificate used on the server have CRL Distribution Point X509 extension? If so, is the URL in there accessible on the affected local machine? The certificate is verified using the functionality OS provides. As a part of that process, the URL mentioned above is accessed.

I wasn't able to reproduce it with the version 1388.4 The version 1398 was released only for a few days and than replaced with 1388.4 The issue is only present in the version 1398 and will be fixed in 1399

I was able to reproduce this issue with Internet protection module 1398. Do you have the same version?

Unfortunately we are not able to provide any update on this issue yet.

According to our testing of www.rahvastikuregister.ee, the issue is on the server side. We recommend you to contact the server administrator. In the meantime, we recommend to add the server certificate of www.rahvastikuregister.ee into the List of known certificates (https://help.eset.com/eav/13/en-US/?idh_config_epfw_ssl.html) and set Scan action to Ignore. The technical details discovered during the testing which might be useful: The issue is present when there is TLS version 1.3 advertised in the Client Hello, but there is not advertised x25519 group in the Supported Groups Client

The issue is fixed in the Internet protection module version 1396; currently it is available on pre-release update servers.

This is very likely the issue we are already aware of. It manifests itself only on a fresh install of our product. It will be addressed by the Internet protection module update.

CVE-2020-0601 is related to ECC, not SHA1. Only Win10 were affected. We have implemented the detection of the attack shortly after is was published, so our users are protected (to be precise, this applies only to the TLS connections scanned by Web access protection, not the complete protection of the whole OS) even if they don't have the Win patch installed.

We already tried to solve this issue. Unfortunately, there is no general solution which would work out-of-the-box. Currently it's put on-hold and there is no progress being made on this.

We were able to reproduce the issue and obtained the log files which confirm the bogus data are added by our product.

Not sure if this is important and would make any difference, but there is missing charset=utf-8 in the content-type header sent by the server.

I checked the provided logs for GET /6.board-5991e97616a5fcf95475.js (as indicated by the screenshot) and there is no garbage at the end in the data passed to the browser. The data have length of 18682 bytes. Wireshark capture is sometimes needed in order to diagnose some kinds of issues. This is not the case.

Only a few selected browsers are supported by default in regards to TLS filtering (https). If you want the communication by Brave browser to be scanned, it must be explicitly setup to Scan, please refer to https://help.eset.com/eav/13/en-US/idh_config_epfw_ssl_app.html In addition, if after this change there are errors in Brave browser related to certificates, it's likely it does not use the Windows OS to verify web servers certificates. In this case, please refer to Root certificate at https://help.eset.com/eav/13/en-US/idh_config_epfw_ssl.html