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Concerns Over Undetected CobaltStrike Samples and Unaddressed Submissions


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Hi,

I've noticed that many CobaltStrike backdoor samples seem to bypass ESET's detection. Below are VT links for some of the undetected samples:

  1. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b3adf38a949bfa704da093f0a23aa8b50c59533c4a0166992264c1bc1c40a78c
  2. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/491d734b97fa86463e610820720d797e1515c6967bda1aded9ac04f2ef33833b
  3. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/db140710092bd084f35c5a0231d8a2a11132ff9ae110d44a61667e3c9120cdc5
  4. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/654a9d346319642bfdcde85e7e5ddd64096f7b8fcd6c1a3c301aafdf9c9a8006
  5. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e804a884b14b64a09be6bcf1c9640df766f6b51f45ce12714bea49f97e344b4
  6. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c758859895cd24dccb9f17f8f82aedb4a4745d3fb57cad878d06ac62b843b93
  7. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/981cc9cf25eaef28d3d612ab1fabb88b815c6fb384b335b89863196ee9ff2563
  8. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/332e78f15424da53065cde5ea787466257ddf33e323012a99b3f00a5e7b4869c
  9. https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/514994cca3303c06443d6cceeac914d3c93b74ab3925753536fd5c0665c7e889

Given the frequency of these misses, it's alarming. I hope ESET can consider enhancing signatures to address such threats more effectively.

I intended to report these via your email channel, but my recent submissions on 8/8/2023, 8/9/2023, and 8/10/2023 received no feedback. Additionally, most samples remain undetected. The tracking numbers for those reports are [TRACK#64D227BD0366], [TRACK#64D23E4702BF], [TRACK#64D3804602F5], [TRACK#64D3815403C1], [TRACK#64D3937F00B7], [TRACK#64D4261401BA], [TRACK#64D4BE8C01E0], [TRACK#64D4C1B6036B] and [TRACK#64D4C46301B9].

Due to the lack of response, I felt it necessary to highlight these samples here. I hope they are addressed swiftly.

Thank you.

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I just reanalyzed a handful of the samples at VT and still no Eset detection. Pretty bad when Grindinsoft can detect these now but not Eset.

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8 hours ago, itman said:

I just reanalyzed a handful of the samples at VT and still no Eset detection. Pretty bad when Grindinsoft can detect these now but not Eset.

Still no detection... 🫠

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10 hours ago, AnthonyQ said:

It needs be noted that Eset sample detection at VT needs to be taken "with a grain of salt" as I have stated numerous times in this forum.

All Eset employs protection-wise at VT is static signature detection for the most part. The only way to fully known if the malware is not actually detected at some stage is to run it. Also if the malware is run in a local sandbox, VM, etc.., that doesn't prove anything since malware these days increasingly deploy anti-sandbox, VM, etc. evasion tactics. That is the malware won't perform any malicious activities.

Let's refer to a specific example using this prior posted sample: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b3adf38a949bfa704da093f0a23aa8b50c59533c4a0166992264c1bc1c40a78c . It's behavior is shown below;

Eset_Behavior.thumb.png.bbccfae83876461be4c9cbc04b6afe42.png

Note that Eset sets a deep behavior inspection hook; i.e. .dll, into cmd.exe. As such, it could have detected it trying to open the .docx file via Winword.

Edited by itman
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https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1a74343354c37fa2ea5e907c498c190fbc691c181ec20af331a20fee383a8947
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6564aff0cb25ce9ee88c3dcef054eff543601079d7563814ad55ce0d61d6f86a
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ef6e61f5ea7feb23596eb21d2a2c3d2bca96c6aa3528987698d8578314c81298
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/886bb4f86960f51a2559dd49afff309b706bedc109fd6def5b3c56b195f8cb59
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6e3b5b81b59cc275f8ff8635c0df8aea8140f6df22dd61812b7f3602e2145b6f
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9b61721bb1649b592528d7af609a53a2508c0005c0f70b5846628336df84ee25
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cf5a7cf49dbbf03d9cc44b351ac305ab0d6f426343b8925b3ce71768be45788b
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ee1d275ab981c09cc9fa9543de702b8c658b969ee18b1d27905f097b3bc7b24e
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/65fa8362917477fa15202c576e0f33a2f3eb7a3a5064bfa3d4c30f2263916ee4
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/52fce42119b43263ba77614b04fe759c05a86b2b33c1ad783c66730e95508aaa
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5912318bb94f7970dc616293d4fbaa582ddc5b397e85bad1cea589aa6729189b
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/20967456a9b8d1614d5d8b978034ef208725ceff8f3963802e4308165adb27cb
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/25d99144028a23747b539bd2824ea59dbbb76ae8d56c75dc6f74fc798a4da59d
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3f895fb242939a693249f8cbbec1f08bb67f077a6ced90c7d9bb544a318d845d
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/35da788bded42115f6382a30464295509ac76f4804ee7ec4fe7ef37abb18d61a
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0953e5ed497cd8906d2dd02911342d28921a85d5a38371f95924f456ad375490
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fba1bf35cbd6ce23439b1f26e5119b696d8860aa784d160a90f9a1125438db42
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/01daafab69cd9f5c70f2562afb459c8832904488a3857a9339af6259b1497961
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f314eded339ab8b55777dcb850eae11d44b680252b20a97bfb67e771b3884647
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/89c1531d2e69f9b1ba652a3edbc71f409129f5d5b08a34ed14350cd0d36e5b54
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/adb1d4603093c0cd7b4cf6c30ac7246cecebde1c30c8480f597ea46413f23f74
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3bba88936e9276bfd734a0aeb69fb7cded00bd3075ec814e308f990b147abbaa
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/862c439be3da9099f615dd94109733a1b6d13d5520dc1de16a17adb55934bde6
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7c646041adc3d4aacd45eb154b0298c6e17eb31f2f302c8c5c717a0c9a988bbf
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8cbd51da771a2e83a733bd47bb18bca685218a11ff9471d30b84fd9a84f1b9db
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fd021535f2a0a40cf6b7a1169f09ee4b21b28d01a00fdf2576ee903488a7f13a
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c39d636360d36403780e7a3f54bc7ae500aa3b58bc786a1fbc7727aa29edbec2
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/efd75242be1dedc028172692da7d0c52fbb562a99017bfd6d12cac626b416c27
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3840afb05d50a03275048b6337631b0bf544cdf09cccbdbf29c21a6a43fa3da5
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e1517eea6ba4a926305b562c4c68e84ab5beee6a4da02cc6682b934ef079fef9
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c3a82743588ecc7bde719de4948599a53da9b6331c334720c2e4240c7918d672
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9d7743e76383dc9b671bfa6b388525b5360486a3445d9cb11a4c1a619eb6811a
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/11106bba596a211e8b5713c9c03e739f9eae0264702034f758303d0d79713c8a
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/634ec3e64acc1ee53f688aff3d13b06c9b9d5823fe9c57cd1c00f702714ff857
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14efcd37c9ab7c9ee10bc8a7964ffd97f40425b18093166f028e0626212cd419
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/34c109caf314a05a6343af65ca3215073c16cd51827e9b727f31f414fad40f07
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5a35414a27ae9223a81774d310ac27212ce57dcca4e8dc4be33805d6eadc4f61
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/fae4c12231fb8267eafe0eef9ffdb765ebae99ed8052653f7ee5f81c93f9d41d
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e5b27155efa206fe100b7853ffdf95a937abdbdcd0075e4fd77329372e37417

Android/FakeApp / ScamApp
All samples were discovered by Dr.Web. Submitted IOCs but ignored.😂
Looks like ESET doesn't even trust their competitor.🤔

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Since the issue is Cobalt Strike detection here, this article is how to mitigate those attacks: https://www.netsurion.com/catches/mitre-attack-guides-msp-cobalt-strike-threat-mitigation . The point to note is cmd.exe is deployed is some form in most of these attacks.

I for one monitor all cmd.exe execution; even those I manually initiate via explorer.exe. Most important is to pay attention to cmd.exe startup from a downloaded unknown and untrusted process. Better yet, monitor any process startup running from %Temp% directory and sub-directories.

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I just ran my own ad hoc test on how long it takes for Eset to create a signature for a Cobalt Strike beacon.

I found a Cobalt Strike sample that was uploaded to the malware sharing web site on 8/11. Verified on VT that Eset was not detecting the sample with a last analyzed time of 9 hours ago. I also noted that the sample had been previously uploaded to VT on 8/3.

Downloaded the sample and upon archive extraction, Eset real-time detected it;

Quote

Time;Scanner;Object type;Object;Detection;Action;User;Information;Hash;First seen here
8/13/2023 3:03:11 PM;Real-time file system protection;file;C:\Users\xxxxx\Downloads\30e835866395298b102bb0bc62ea0d2f8aa26bd06bb38a6dc4112beb4df2219f.exe;Win64/CobaltStrike.Agent.J trojan;cleaned by deleting;xxxxxxxx;Event occurred on a new file created by the application: C:\Program Files\7-Zip\7zG.exe (DF22612647E9404A515D48EBAD490349685250DE).;D623C9BB721F0A30770ACD6F67053F6554185BA9;8/13/2023 3:02:56 PM

So sometime in the last 9 hours, Eset created a signature for this Cobalt Strike beacon. Confirmed when I reanalyzed it at VT.

From this test, one can expect a Cobalt Strike signature detection at around 10 days after submission to VT.😱

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Why Cobalt Strike beacon attacks are so difficult to detect:

Quote

The goal for any Cobalt Strike attack is the deployment of a post-exploitation payload, known as a  “Beacon,'' onto a compromised endpoint. While some Cobalt Strike attacks can involve executables such as DLL files or libraries being installed on a targeted endpoint, most work by injecting malicious shellcode into legitimate processes. With Cobalt Strike payloads uniquely generated for specific victims and hidden within innocent processes and applications, antivirus solutions that rely on recognizable malicious signatures cannot see or stop them. 

Because Cobalt Strike shellcode can move via the named pipes used for inter-process communication within Windows and Unix machines, malicious shellcode will remain invisible even when an antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) solution uses a sandbox — unless it is configured to emulate named pipes (which is rare).

Although Cobalt Strike is a command and control (C2) framework, which means that attacks rely on attackers establishing communication with clients installed on targeted machines, analyzing network traffic is not a reliable way of finding and stopping Cobalt Strike Beacons. 

The reason why is simple: the way in which Cobalt Strike conducts network egress is highly customizable and capable of mimicking traffic from legitimate applications. This feature of the Cobalt Strike platform called “Malleable C2” allows attackers to adapt command and control traffic (C2) to the kind of legitimate traffic that is likely to come from an uncompromised victim device. As a result, threat actors can configure Cobalt Strike to blend in with background noise, making traffic-based detection far more difficult. Critically, the stagers (programs that can be used to download sections of the Beacon payload)  that Cobalt Strike uses to download the Beacon payload deploy mostly in device memory. Consequently, this stage of an attack is completely hidden from antivirus solutions that do not scan device memory.

https://blog.morphisec.com/how-to-stop-ransomware-breach-prevention-vs-cobalt-strike-backdoor

As noted, don't rely on a Cobalt Strike beacon signature for stopping future attacks using a modified version of the beacon. This also might explain why it takes so long for Eset to develop a "smart" signature for Cobalt Strike beacon.

Edited by itman
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On 8/11/2023 at 2:39 PM, itman said:

I just reanalyzed a handful of the samples at VT and still no Eset detection. Pretty bad when Grindinsoft can detect these now but not Eset.

I said it 100 time already: look at Microsoft Defender: free, 99.8% detection rate vs 99.2%  and detecting these.....

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12 minutes ago, rotaru said:

I said it 100 time already: look at Microsoft Defender: free, 99.8% detection rate vs 99.2%  and detecting these.....

MD didn't detect any of the Cobalt Strike samples originally posted in this thread at the time of their posting.

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3 hours ago, itman said:

Why Cobalt Strike beacon attacks are so difficult to detect:

https://blog.morphisec.com/how-to-stop-ransomware-breach-prevention-vs-cobalt-strike-backdoor

As noted, don't rely on a Cobalt Strike beacon signature for stopping future attacks using a modified version of the beacon. This also might explain why it takes so long for Eset to develop a "smart" signature for Cobalt Strike beacon.

Creating a smart detection for these backdoor threats (mainly Trojan downloader) might be hard but blocking them in the LiveGrid is not so difficult. 

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1 hour ago, itman said:

MD didn't detect any of the Cobalt Strike samples originally posted in this thread at the time of their posting.

Just checked this one , done 1 day ago:

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/db140710092bd084f35c5a0231d8a2a11132ff9ae110d44a61667e3c9120cdc5

No detection from ESET

Detection from Microsoft Defender

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22 hours ago, AnthonyQ said:

Creating a smart detection for these backdoor threats (mainly Trojan downloader) might be hard but blocking them in the LiveGrid is not so difficult. 

If I recollect correctly, Eset at VT does not employ LiveGrid blacklisting.

The only way to know if Eset is currently blocking your posted samples via LiveGrid blacklist is to run them in a VM.

Edited by itman
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Today I found this Cobalt Strike sample that was close to a 0-day one that Eset detected;

https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1290695/0/html

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f7d1d66f821a925c3765b17fda917f7a65621cf57b6289f0e4f7abbebd53aab8/details

The point to note in this instance was the beacon download code was embedded in a .vbs script run from a powershell script. Also, no one at VT detected this malware as Cobalt Strike and all the detections were for the NetSupport RAT vbs script code.

Edited by itman
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9 hours ago, itman said:

If I recollect correctly, Eset at VT does not employ LiveGrid blacklisting.

The only way to know if Eset is currently blocking your posted samples via LiveGrid blacklist is to run them in a VM.

Currently, most of my posted threats are detected as WinGo/CobaltStrike.Beacon.xx or Win32/CobaltStrike.Beacon.xx. 

But there are still many undetected CS backdoor trojans in the wild, e.g., https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e67a68056eb4299602cdeb9e52be77b6862d0f7a7ad21a651d520189963caab6https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/54fb06778a2ae9c92a2ee6cc2d0a36ed51d8ff85efbdfb05ba5e2dcc5d2c8c51https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/9254bb2f7b9ee19e6ca1110fd715dc3e8a9fb38e7a2ea43d43b0c5c1b9ff5f38https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/baee8be767db634c6d2d4de7de4739dce5b948dcd4dbfc5bd73dd3c9bf335467https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ed34aa09630f7d4cf033e821322c6ccf9243757115c2587eb000e369d0e87d33. They are not particularly fresh but sadly both local scanner and LiveGrid cannot detect them.

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14 hours ago, AnthonyQ said:

Currently, most of my posted threats are detected as WinGo/CobaltStrike.Beacon.xx or Win32/CobaltStrike.Beacon.xx. 

Actually, only half of them are being detected as Cobalt Strike with the rest detecting its delivery malware;

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/491d734b97fa86463e610820720d797e1515c6967bda1aded9ac04f2ef33833b - Win64/Agent.CTD

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e804a884b14b64a09be6bcf1c9640df766f6b51f45ce12714bea49f97e344b4 - A Variant Of Win64/GenKryptik.GMTF

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c758859895cd24dccb9f17f8f82aedb4a4745d3fb57cad878d06ac62b843b93 - A Variant Of Generik.EEDJWGG

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/981cc9cf25eaef28d3d612ab1fabb88b815c6fb384b335b89863196ee9ff2563 - A Variant Of Win64/TrojanDownloader.Age

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/332e78f15424da53065cde5ea787466257ddf33e323012a99b3f00a5e7b4869c - Win64/TrojanDownloader.Agent.AGT

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/514994cca3303c06443d6cceeac914d3c93b74ab3925753536fd5c0665c7e889 - A Variant Of Generik.EPVCRER

illustrating the difficultly in identifying the beacon code.

What I have observed is in many of these .exe samples the beacon code is encrypted. Decryption of this code might be occurring via named pipe convention as previously posted. In any case, Eset needs to improve is memory scanning capability in this regard.

Of note is Kaspersky appears to be the only mainstream AV to detect these Cobalt Strike beacons at first sight. What I have observed is its initial detection name is prefixed with "VHO" which is later removed from the detection at VT. I suspect this is Kaspersky's "on-the-fly" signature creation at work which @SeriousHoax commented on in other forum threads. Perhaps its time Eset colaborate with Kaspersky in regards to how its able to detect these beacons.

Edited by itman
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What do Cobalt Strike beacons look like?

Here's one from a sample @AnthonyQ posted this morning using port 443;

CS_Beacon_1.thumb.png.6b3df77079bc13c1bc3b4daa35db43a6.png

Here's one from a Joe's Cloud sandbox analysis using port 80;

Quote

{
  "BeaconType": [
    "HTTP"
  ],
  "Port": 80,
  "SleepTime": 60000,
  "MaxGetSize": 1048576,
  "Jitter": 0,
  "C2Server": "23.227.203.229,/pixel",
  "HttpPostUri": "/submit.php",
  "Malleable_C2_Instructions": [],
  "SpawnTo": "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==",
  "HttpGet_Verb": "GET",
  "HttpPost_Verb": "POST",
  "HttpPostChunk": 0,
  "Spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe",
  "Spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\rundll32.exe",
  "CryptoScheme": 0,
  "Proxy_Behavior": "Use IE settings",
  "Watermark": 1359593325,
  "bStageCleanup": "False",
  "bCFGCaution": "False",
  "KillDate": 0,
  "bProcInject_StartRWX": "True",
  "bProcInject_UseRWX": "True",
  "bProcInject_MinAllocSize": 0,
  "ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86": "Empty",
  "ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64": "Empty",
  "ProcInject_Execute": [
    "CreateThread",
    "SetThreadContext",
    "CreateRemoteThread",
    "RtlCreateUserThread"
  ],
  "ProcInject_AllocationMethod": "VirtualAllocEx",
  "bUsesCookies": "True",
  "HostHeader": ""
}

The common code between the two beacons;

Quote

"BeaconType":

"Port"

"C2Server"

"Spawnto_x86": "%windir%\\syswow64\\rundll32.exe"
 "Spawnto_x64": "%windir%\\sysnative\\rundll32.exe"

"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x86":
"ProcInject_PrependAppend_x64":

I guess this is an identification start.

Edited by itman
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9 hours ago, itman said:

Actually, only half of them are being detected as Cobalt Strike with the rest detecting its delivery malware;

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/491d734b97fa86463e610820720d797e1515c6967bda1aded9ac04f2ef33833b - Win64/Agent.CTD

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e804a884b14b64a09be6bcf1c9640df766f6b51f45ce12714bea49f97e344b4 - A Variant Of Win64/GenKryptik.GMTF

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c758859895cd24dccb9f17f8f82aedb4a4745d3fb57cad878d06ac62b843b93 - A Variant Of Generik.EEDJWGG

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/981cc9cf25eaef28d3d612ab1fabb88b815c6fb384b335b89863196ee9ff2563 - A Variant Of Win64/TrojanDownloader.Age

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/332e78f15424da53065cde5ea787466257ddf33e323012a99b3f00a5e7b4869c - Win64/TrojanDownloader.Agent.AGT

https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/514994cca3303c06443d6cceeac914d3c93b74ab3925753536fd5c0665c7e889 - A Variant Of Generik.EPVCRER

illustrating the difficultly in identifying the beacon code.

What I have observed is in many of these .exe samples the beacon code is encrypted. Decryption of this code might be occurring via named pipe convention as previously posted. In any case, Eset needs to improve is memory scanning capability in this regard.

Of note is Kaspersky appears to be the only mainstream AV to detect these Cobalt Strike beacons at first sight. What I have observed is its initial detection name is prefixed with "VHO" which is later removed from the detection at VT. I suspect this is Kaspersky's "on-the-fly" signature creation at work which @SeriousHoax commented on in other forum threads. Perhaps its time Eset colaborate with Kaspersky in regards to how its able to detect these beacons.

VHO might stand for Vishash Offline, which is a unique detection technique employed by Kaspersky. I believe there’s an official channel for ESET and Kaspersky to exchange IOCs, but sharing detection technology might be impossible.

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18 hours ago, itman said:

Kaspersky appears to be the only mainstream AV to detect these Cobalt Strike beacons at first sight. What I have observed is its initial detection name is prefixed with "VHO"

VHO and HEUR are the heuristic namings if I am not mistaken

You will find them on Checkpoint , ZoneAlarm , Bitdefender I think also , because those use the kaspersky engine.

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I have a pretty good idea as to Eset's lack of Cobalt Strike beacon detection. It's not that Eset can't detect them at first sight, it just won't do so.

I have had some DNS hijack incidents of late. To verify I did not not have some malware undetected by Eset, I downloaded and ran Kaspersky's Antivirus Tool (KVRT) and ran a full system scan including all internal hard drives. The only thing KVRT detected was 18 hack tools, POC's, etc. I have accumulated over the years used for testing purposes. Obviously, none of these had been detected by Eset.

Cobalt Strike per se is not malware. It is a legit penetration test tool widely used by computer security audit concerns; an expensive one at that:https://www.cobaltstrike.com/product/pricing-plans . The problem with it, as with other like software, is these products always seem to be acquired by hackers.

Eset will not detect hack tools per se. Only Eset can answer why but I suspect it has to do with false positive detection and Eset's aborence of such. If Cobalt Strike detection at first sight is a major concern, one would be better served using Kaspersky or a product that uses its engine which will detect hack tools.

Edited by itman
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Some Cobalt Strike beacon's appear to be totally "off the detection radar."

Such is the case of this beacon deployed by Play ransomware that has never been submitted to VT.

Courtesy of TrendMicro: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/ransomware-spotlight/ransomware-spotlight-play

-EDIT- Also this beacon will run a .bat script which is atypical of many CS beacons;Eset_Beacon.png.7740f688f117c26faec6b792aa0e875f.png

Hence, why I monitor all cmd.exe execution.

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SHA-256 Hash - c316627897a78558356662a6c64621ae25c3c3893f4b363a4b3f27086246038d
Detection name - Backdoor.Win32.COBEACON.YXCH3
Description - Cobalt Strike

Edited by itman
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Since I brought up Play ransomware, its latest supply chain attack method is most disturbing;

'Play' Ransomware Group Targeting MSPs Worldwide in New Campaign

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As with other attacks involving MSPs, the Play or PlayCrypt group breaks into MSP systems and uses their remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to get unfettered access to the networks and systems of customers of the MSPs. It is a tactic that other threat actors have used with substantial impact. The most notable example remains the REvil ransomware group's attack on multiple MSP via vulnerabilities in Kaseya's Virtual System Administrator (VSA) network monitoring tool. The attack resulted in the encryption of data on the systems of more than 1,000 customers of these MSPs.

Kevin O'Connor, director of threat research at Adlumin, says his company's research shows the threat actors gain access to privileged management systems and RMM tools via a phishing campaign that targets employees at MSPs.  "[This] leads to compromise of their systems and access either through direct exploitation or credential harvesting and reuse" he says.

https://www.darkreading.com/cloud/-play-ransomware-group-targeting-msps-worldwide-in-new-campaign

Bottom line - zero trust is a must - pun intended.

Edited by itman
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Since Eset won't detect Cobalt Strike beacons until Eset Lab analysis is done on them, I am posting a couple of articles on behavior detection of the beacons. The detection method doable via Eset HIPS capability which happens to be the most used method for deploying beacons is;

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Proxy execution via RunDLL32 and Regsvr32 remains the most popular method for executing Cobalt Strike beacons. You can hunt for executions of the binaries from suspicious locations.

label="Process" label=Create "process" IN ["*\rundll32.exe", "*\regsvr32.exe"] command IN ["*C:\ProgramData\*", "*C:\Users\Public\*", "*C:\PerfLogs\*", "*\AppData\Local\Temp\*", "*\AppData\Roaming\Temp\*"]

https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/how-to-detect-stealthy-cobalt-strike-activity-in-your-enterprise/

What you're looking for when the HIPS alert triggers if an ask rule is used is the following. However, I would make the HIPS rule/s a block one since there is no reason rundll32.exe or regsvc32.exe should be running from the above noted directories.

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Process Activity.

rundll32.exe:

Used in Lateral Movement by Cobalt Strike beacons: rundll32.exe being spawned by another process(es) and its process execution included no arguments.

Detection Logic

Keep track and alert on unusual processes spawning rundll32.exe

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Used in Post Exploitation in Cobalt strike related attacks: rundll32.exe spawning processes like Adfind.exe,* Net.exe, or any other Windows processes used for systems, services or network discovery.

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Cobalt strike beacons often spoof processes like “word.exe”, or “excel.exe” to “explorer.exe” so that when the child process is launched the telemetry reported by the EDR agent makes the detection of unusual process chains difficult.

https://socfortress.medium.com/detecting-cobalt-strike-beacons-3f8c9fdcb654

Note that Cobalt Strike pipes the rundll32.exe argument payload name making it "invisible" to AV solutions.

* Refer to prior posted TrendMicro Play Ransomware attack analysis on the use of Adfind.exe.

Edited by itman
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Another important point about Cobalt Strike is the ability to deploy an AMSI bypass;

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The amsi_disable option directs powerpick, execute-assembly, and psinject to patch the AmsiScanBuffer function before loading .NET or PowerShell code. This limits the Antimalware Scan Interface visibility into these capabilities.

https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/topics/malleable-c2-extend_controll-post-exploitation.htm

Also and important is Eset's HIPS recommended anti-ransomware rules to prevent script startup from rundll32.exe won't work since that rule is only monitoring child process creation from its default Windows directory locations.

Edited by itman
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