itman

AV-Comparatives has a write up on uTube security test sources. The most important point to note is these concerns are not formally recognized AV lab testing sources. As such, they don't adhere to formalized and verifiable testing standards. https://www.av-comparatives.org/youtube-security-channels/

Doubt this is the case. From what I can determine, PC Security Channel is not an AMTSO member: https://www.amtso.org/members/ This test falls into the category of all ad hoc Internet tests whose results cannot be verified and therefore should be ignored. The only exception I can think of would be Runbenking's PC Magazine tests employing the Core Impact tools. He has been doing those for years and is very upfront on how and what he tests for.

This is immaterial per se. Although I do have a HIPS rule to monitor all PowerShell execution. Also, Eset has a KB article in regards to PowerShell HIPS rule monitoring as it applies to FileCoders.

I will say this. If traces of the Python engine code are detected in an .exe, Eset should flag that .exe as suspicious.

As far as the first test phase, the malware .exe's were dropped in %AppDataUser% directories. So I don't know why those weren't detected. I personally have a HIPS rule that monitors any process startup in those directories. As far as the Python based ransomware, it first needs to be verified if the tester had previously installed Python on the test rig. If so, then running of a malicious Python script would be much easier to accomplish. Note that the average user would not be installing Python. Now there are malware attacks that can download the Python engine "on the fly" with a malicious script. However, this requires the previous to be "bundled" in a .exe. If the script was encrypted, obfuscated, packed, etc.., it would be hard to detect in memory since Win 10 AMSI interface does not scan Python scripts.

Well, that didn't work. Only God knows what the heck Microsoft is doing to initiate the ICMP outbound connection. So I am just allowing that single IP address for the time being.

@Marcos, fairly certain I have identified the source of the alert. Alert time corresponds to startup of a scheduled task running sedlauncher.exe that was installed courtesy of KB4023057. This bugger is Microsoft's monitoring of Win10 1803 for suitability to upgrade to 1809. When the alert appears is there a way to create an exception by process name? Never mind, found out how to do so.

Yes it can detect it if PUA protection is enabled. PUA protection is most effective at software installation time. Possibly the concern overrode the PUA alert? In any case, have the concern run a full system scan with Admin privileges.

I don't use Skype. I will not worry about it for the time being unless it reappears in any frequency. I am curious as to why Eset appears to be sending outbound traffic directly from its internal proxy?

This morning I received the following alerts for the first time ever. Note that both times these alerts were generated I was on the Eset forum web site using IE11. Note the IP address which is Akamai: The alert also stated that malicious traffic was being sent from my PC via ICMP. Looking at the Eset default firewall rules in regards to ICMP IPv4, the only outbound connections allowed are for echo and to 224.0.0.0/4, Trusted Zone, and local connections. There is nothing defined in Trusted Zone and I use the Public profile. The only suspect in local connection is localhost; 127.0.0.x. This leads to the next screen shot: Note the Eset proxy activity being sent to the same to the same Akamai IP address associated with the alerted ICMP activity. Now what I have done is run ipconfig /flushdns to clear the local DNS cache which appears to have so far stopped the Eset ICMP alerts. But I really would like to know what is going on here.

Here's a reference to a targeted SWIFT attack against Bank of Bangladesh: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/25/bangladeshi_malware_screwed_swift/ . Here's a detailed technical analysis of the incident: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2016/04/two-bytes-to-951m.html . Of note: Eset detects the malware associated with the above hash value.

DyePack namely Hacktool.APT.DYEPACK has been around since 2015. I assume Eset has a signature/detection for it. To 100% verify this, a hash value would be needed. This malware is directed toward SWIFT based operations at financial institutions. Also believe most of the targets were within France.

@Marcos , chaulk this up to "sometimes you post dumb things." What I was using for testing via admin level command window was: reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe" /v debugger /d "c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" The alert I was getting was from reg.exe trying to start. I monitor all reg.exe execution with an Ask HIPS rule.

Yes, I knew that. The question is just what does the Debug another application monitor for? Most likely windbg.exe use I assume. Too much work. Below are screen shots of the rule in question:

Internet Security 12.0.27 First up is the block action as it pertains to monitoring of registry key changes. An Eset alert is generated to block or allow even if the Notify User option is disabled . In other words, the block action behaves identical to an ask action with the exemption that thankfully, the action will be blocked after the alert display times out. Such is not the case if the monitoring action is for an application. This works as expected with no Eset alert generated. Next is the HIPS action pertaining to Debug another application. I assumed this rule would monitor the following type of activity: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe "debugger"="c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe" That is when sethc.exe is started, what actually runs is cmd.exe. I created a HIPS rule with cmd.exe as the source application, the action Debug another application, and the target application as sethc.exe and the activity was not detected by the HIPS.

Per Robtex: Per Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Webtrekk Appears your web traffic is being tracked.

Now this is strange. I reinstalled IS 12.0.27 yesterday from a download from the Eset U.S. web site. Prior to this, I had 12.0.27 installed via the in-program upgrade feature from the latest ver. 11. The upgraded 12.0.27 ver. did show the Eset GUI Refer Friend option. This latest direct download install of 12.0.27 does not. Me thinks that the problem lies in the direct download from Eset.

@Marcos , I found the issue. Somehow "minimum verbosity of events to display" got set to the Error level versus Diagnostic. I honestly don't recall fooling around with that setting.

Don't know what you mean by "IB Pages?" None of the links you posted will cause Eset BP&P to launch or prompt to launch on my PC either. Also, like the OP stated, both Bank of America and Wells Fargo do launch Eset BP&P.

On my Win 10 x(64) 1803 build when I do the same, the following processes are started: SystemSettings.exe backgroundTaskHost.exe SpeechRuntime.exe No evidence of any attempt to run cmd.exe. You possibly have a corrupted user account/settings or a number of other issues. Here's something to review: https://www.maketecheasier.com/fix-settings-app-not-working-in-windows-10/ . Of note:

Eset_Settings_12-0-27_11-27-2018.zip

Do you mean Windows Update settings via the Eset GUI or "Display Settings?" If the later, you will have to elaborate more on what you are doing.

Reinstall of IS 11.0.27 didn't correct the issue. So as far as I am concerned, the lack of alerting is a bug.

I just exported/imported by Eset settings using Internet Security 12.0.27 w/o issue.

I tired a few. None of the below prompted to open in secure browser in IS 12.0.27 on IE11: https://www.scotiabank.com/ca/en/0,,2,00.html https://www.bmo.com/main/personal https://www.rbcroyalbank.com/personal.html