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thrilla_killa

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Posts posted by thrilla_killa

  1. I get that as well.  Trust me, I completely know and understand how to strengthen security.  That is my Blue Team's job.  On the Red Team, my goal is to emulate threat actors and processes.  In this case, again, very generic attacks were undetected from the client level.  Other segments using other solutions detected these items and stopped them during or before runtime.

  2. I get it, there are mitigations that can be taken by the business.  However, the AV should catch malicious payloads and terminate generic items like "meterpreter" when they are in memory, and in the active Red Team tests we conducted, they did not.  Though, they got a local .ps1 file.  But why would they not be able to quarantine an IN MEMORY, malicious and widely known process like meterpreter???

  3. None of these tests were conducted on a standalone machine.  The testing occurred in a business environment running the latest ESET Endpoint Security with the Firewall setting, Dangerous Applications, Potentially Unsafe applications and Live Grid settings on as well as the AMSI scanner.  The OS's in use were never HOME editions, they were fully patched Windows 10 Enterprise builds in an Enterprise environment. 

    The attack was also not executed via RDP either.  The attack occurred when a user opened an MS Office document that was provided to them in a phishing campaign against the business. (Email protection was enabled as well).

    Another quick note regarding the local execution of powershell scripts: Meterpreter .ps1 files are detected (hooray!) after execution, however, they fail to kill the session and still allow the attacker to have full control of the meterpreter session after the execution of the .ps1 file(?!?!?! does that count as not detected???).  Memory scans and disk scans post execution detect nothing.  Not. One. Thing.

    I think the verbiage you have in the AMSI scanner for the business product needs to state that it "only detects locally executed powershell attacks" and that "botnet protection" only stops communications of known botnets.

    Also, how does ESET Augur play into all of this when an item is validly malicious in nature?

  4. Even testing super generic reverse_tcp connectors coded as powershell commands, when loading from an external source and not executing on disk, the script executes flawlessly without ESET intervention and will produce a command shell back to the attacking machine.  ALL ESET settings are on and updated such as the AMSI scanner, Unsafe applications, dangerous applications, Live Grid, etc...

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