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Script, Undetected by ESET loading from startup folder [culprit found]


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Eset never detected this virus embedded in Minitool... a malicious script is dropped by a compromised Minitool Partition Wizard. Files attached.

I created a custom hips to detect files dropped into the \roamiming\ws folder, hoping one day I would find the culprit, it payed off:

1054338832_MiniToolPartitionWizardResponsible.png.e87b1bed96bf8341ccb58435d862faff.png

Continued:  from:

MiniTool Partition Wizard 12.zip

Edited by Tzatz
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Yes, a bit of disappointment since there was a lengthily posting back in July in the forum on this Win "living off the land" binary abuse. 

Since you didn't post all Hybrid-Analysis details on this specific attack, here they are:

Eset_Virus.thumb.png.685b7b541d3454f0d51fb8f6e44ebc0a.png

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e0f8a75737f932454aa9a325d35a7abc837fd05c23b5a5d1360d6ba1a6fb6479/60fbc6767746783ee4496bf6

BTW - OSArmor will protect against this specific Win LOL binary abuse since it specifically monitors for CertUtil execution with a command string attached. Ditto for all other known Win LOL binary abuse attack methods.

Edited by itman
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Another clever element of this attack is the malware is bundled the Minitool Partition Wizard .exe installer. It is not unusual for installers to create files in the %Temp% and/or %AppData% directories and execute them. As such if one was monitoring these directories for process startup activities via Eset HIPS rules, it could be assumed any such created processes would be allowed to run.

Also, Eset HIPS recommended anti-ransomware rules would have not prevented the renamed wscript.exe; i.e. ws.exe, from running from the %Temp% directory. This again highlights that the Eset HIPS should be monitoring .exe PE header name and provide global wildcard capability; e.g. *\wscript.exe, to block startup from any directory location.

Edited by itman
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A few more comments.

I went to the MiniTool Partition Wizard vendor's web site and downloaded the free version. The download was named pw1205-demo.exe. Next, the download was signed with a Sertigo code signed certificate.

However, the file listed on VirusTotal is named, PartitionWizard.exe, and it is unsigned.

Obviously, the malicious version of this software is not a legit version of MiniTool Partition Wizard.

Edited by itman
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On 11/10/2021 at 6:23 PM, itman said:

BTW - OSArmor will protect against this specific Win LOL binary abuse since it specifically monitors for CertUtil execution with a command string attached. Ditto for all other known Win LOL binary abuse attack methods.

Does that work like AppArmor in Linux?

And have you tested it with ESET?

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2 hours ago, Nightowl said:

Does that work like AppArmor in Linux?

And have you tested it with ESET?

Refer to this for what the software does: https://www.osarmor.com/ .

Also, there are threads for software use and support on both wilderssecurity.com and malwaretips.com where it is quite popular.

And yes, I run OSArmor concurrently with EIS with no conflicts. I do exclude Eset files and processes from OSArmor. But no exclusions for it in Eset.

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On 11/10/2021 at 10:23 AM, itman said:

Yes, a bit of disappointment since there was a lengthily posting back in July in the forum on this Win "living off the land" binary abuse. 

Since you didn't post all Hybrid-Analysis details on this specific attack, here they are:

Eset_Virus.thumb.png.685b7b541d3454f0d51fb8f6e44ebc0a.png

https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e0f8a75737f932454aa9a325d35a7abc837fd05c23b5a5d1360d6ba1a6fb6479/60fbc6767746783ee4496bf6

BTW - OSArmor will protect against this specific Win LOL binary abuse since it specifically monitors for CertUtil execution with a command string attached. Ditto for all other known Win LOL binary abuse attack methods.

Interesting article on the issue of LOLs.

https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/open-source-project-aims-to-detect-living-off-the-land-attacks

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11 hours ago, NewbyUser said:

Appears this tool is designed to be used in final verdict rendering by a human after a suspicious detection has been received from the AV solution:

Quote

Adobe's tool is best-suited for working with security log data, but it can work on any source of flat log data that follow the same patterns, such as authentication logs, Web server logs, and access logs, Adobe stated.

https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/adobe-open-sources-tool-for-anomaly-research

This is applicable to EDTD where suspicious verdicts are returned to the originating source. Such is not the case for LiveGuard.

BTW - Microsoft is also starting to use like ML analysis: https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/microsoft-uses-machine-learning-to-predict-attackers-next-steps/d/d-id/1340642 . Again, this appears to be to inform an installation that they are being attacked so they can implement defensive measures against it.

Edited by itman
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